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WHY FAMILY CAP LAWS JUST AREN'T GETTING IT DONE
INTRODUCTION
Public assistance has long been an essential source of support
for indigent Americans, yet the program itself has always been
the center of great political controversy. From the time of its
implementation during the New Deal, the structure of the public
assistance program in America has always reflected the perceptions
of policymakers as well as the public. As a result, this structure also
reflects the broader goals that politicians embrace and aim to
achieve through welfare reform. At the heart of the political battle
over public assistance are debates over the practical implementa-
tion of welfare legislation and regulations that are designed to
further these objectives.
Recently, a new war in the American welfare state has erupted:
the debate over the validity and utility of family cap legislation.
Family cap laws place a ceiling on the amount of benefits that a
welfare family can receive by denying additional benefits to
families that would normally receive an increase in funds when an
additional child is born into that family. Since the dramatic
welfare reform of the 1990s that culminated in the passage of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA),' family cap legislation has become a particularly
popular instrument in reforming the American public assistance
program. In implementing these laws, states seek to promote
certain objectives that they see as fundamental to true welfare
reform, such as encouraging self-sufficiency, discouraging depend-
ency on the government, and promoting marriage and family values
among recipients. Over the past few decades, opponents of family
cap laws have attacked the constitutionality of this legislation
under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, arguing that family
1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 21
U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
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cap laws violate due process and equal protection.2 The vast
majority of legal scholars who have analyzed family cap laws have
also focused on the constitutional implications of the legislation.3
Despite these efforts, the few courts that have encountered the
issue refuse to overturn the state laws on constitutional grounds.'
It is from this point in the chronology of welfare reform that this
Note develops.
The judicial response to constitutional challenges of family cap
laws has been overtly negative. The Supreme Court has never
struck down a family cap law as unconstitutional, and lower federal
and state courts have repeatedly upheld state implementation of
these provisions.5 Thus, it is clear that despite the abundance of
legal scholars who criticize family cap legislation as unconstitu-
tional, the courts continue to show great deference to the states that
have passed these laws. Due to the judiciary's resistance to strike
down such family cap legislation, opponents of the laws should re-
focus their advocacy efforts toward the state and federal legisla-
tures. In persuading legislators that family cap laws should be
abolished, opponents should argue that these laws fail to serve their
own goals, the goals of PRWORA, and the goals of the American
welfare system, and that consequently, the government should no
longer use family cap laws as a way to reform the American welfare
system. Hence, this Note abandons the more traditional critique of
family cap laws-that they are unconstitutional-in favor of a more
pragmatic approach that may actually encourage legislators to re-
assess the objectives and effectiveness of family cap laws.
This Note reaches that conclusion through a consideration of the
legal history that underlies the current controversy over family cap
legislation. Part I of this Note discusses the development of the
American welfare system from its inception through the 1990s and
the passage of PRWORA. This Part analyzes the purposes and goals
of the welfare system and how those objectives changed throughout
the mid- to late-twentieth century. Part II explores the history of
family cap provisions as well as various state legislative approaches
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part III.B.
4. See infra Part III.C.
5. See infra Part III.C.
374 [Vol. 46:373
FAMILY CAP LAWS
to implementing these laws. This Part also examines the purpose
and goals of family cap laws. Part III reviews the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, its application to family cap laws, and the
arguments surrounding the constitutionality of family cap provi-
sions. This Part also addresses judicial treatment of these laws at
the federal and state level, concluding that courts are reluctant to
strike them down as unconstitutional. Part IV moves beyond case
law and analyzes whether family cap laws are meeting the goals
they set out to achieve. In addition, this Part addresses whether
these laws are meeting both the goals of PRWORA and particularly
the broader goals of the traditional American welfare system. The
Note finds that family cap laws are ineffective because of their
inability to achieve their own goals as well as the goals of both
PRWORA and the American welfare system, and it concludes that
legislators should abandon these provisions as a means of welfare
reform.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES
In 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Dealers
pushed through Congress the most significant social legislation to
date-the Social SecurityAct of 1935.6 Envisioning a comprehensive
welfare system that would provide a financial safety net for needy
Americans, the politicians of the 1930s fixed their sights on the
long-term, idealistic goal that a successful public assistance
program could indeed eradicate poverty.7 As time passed and as the
6. Social Security Act (Old Age Pension Act), ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
7. See William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1838-39 (2001); see also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535, 544 (1972) ("The history and purpose of the Social Security Act do indicate
Congress' desire to help those on welfare become self-sustaining."); Kathleen A. Kost &
Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: 1990's Welfare Reform and
the Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 3, 18 (1996) (noting that
"[plassage of the Social Security Act ... established that the national economy ... was the
'problem' as well as the 'solution' to poverty" and characterizing the federal creation of public
assistance in 1935 as "poverty relief"). Even during the recent passage of PRWORA, the 1996
welfare reform law that severely limited the poor's access to public assistance, Congress
implicitly recognized this goal of eliminating poverty when it acknowledged that the purpose
of public assistance was, in part, to "end the dependence of needy parents on government
2004] 375
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number of Americans reliant on welfare grew, however,
policymakers' sentiments of providing for the indigent turned into
frustration with a welfare system that seemed to propagate
dependency on the government. By the 1990s, this frustration had
reached a climax, culminating in the passage of the most drastic
welfare reform of the century. Yet the journey that the public
assistance program took from the New Deal to the present is not
quite this simplistic. Instead, it is littered with changes in social
norms and economic trends that ultimately help to explain how the
ideals on which the American public assistance program was
initially based have led to the welfare system of today.
A. The Creation of Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)
When President Roosevelt's administration initiated the imple-
mentation of national social programs during the New Deal, it
focused primarily on providing a safety net for Americans who
might otherwise sink into poverty, thereby attempting to lift all
Americans out of poverty.8 Through the Social Security Act of 1935, 9
the New Dealers developed social insurance and public assistance
programs on the national level to meet their policy goals. As they
created the nation's first federal public assistance program, they
also looked to employment as an important instrument in achieving
their broad, long-term objective of eliminating poverty.'0 Overall,
the ideal behind these new social programs was to ensure that
Americans had sufficient social insurance and employment
opportunities so that the need for public assistance would subse-
quently dissipate."
One public assistance program that the Social Security Act of
1935 created was Aid to Dependent Children (ADC). 2 For the first
benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage." 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000).
8. See Forbath, supra note 7, at 1838.
9. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
10. See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 7, at 1838-39.
11. Id.
12. Social Security Act (Old Age Pension Act), ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29
(1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 (2000)). The Social Security Act of 1935
also created several other important public benefit programs, including old-age assistance,
ch. 531, § 1, 49 Stat. at 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 301), and unemployment
compensation benefits, ch. 531, § 301, 49 Stat. at 626 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
376 [Vol. 46:373
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time at the federal level, the government provided cash assistance
for mothers to provide for their impoverished children. 13 Though the
government distributed the benefits to mothers, they were intended
to support only their children. 14 The New Dealers modeled ADC
after mothers' pension programs previously implemented by the
states.1 5 The rationale underlying mothers' pension programs and
ADC was the same: the government should provide assistance to
poor mothers to allow them to stay at home to raise their children
and to avoid employment outside the home. 6 Thus, the New Deal
government intended ADC to encourage mothers to actively and
properly raise their children with care and without the financial
worries that usually accompany unemployment.
During its initial implementation, ADC was both a failure and a
success. Strict eligibility requirements at the state and local level,
particularly in the South, stunted the government's ability to bring
people out of poverty. 7 Because ADC was a federal program that
delegated to the states much of the power to determine the
501). Over the years Congress has broadened the benefits that the act provides to include
public assistance like disability insurance benefits, Pub. L. No. 84-880 § 103(a), 70 Stat. 807,
815 (1956) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 423), and supplemental security income for
the aged, blind, and disabled, Pub. L. No. 92-603 § 301, 86 Stat. 1329, 1465 (1972) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1381). These other benefit programs, however, are not relevant
to this discussion because family cap laws only restrict the cash benefits available to families
through ADC (and its successor programs). As a result, this Note analyzes only the ADC
program.
13. See Social Security Act (Old Age Pension Act), ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-
29 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 (2000)); MARTIN GILENS, WHY
AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 18
(1999).
14. See, e.g., GILENS, supra note 13, at 18.
15. See Forbath, supra note 7, at 1839, 1850-51.
16. See GILENS, supra note 13, at 178; Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social
Citizenship: Challenging the NeoliberalAttack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783,799-800
(2003); Carol Sanger, Separating From Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 476 (1996).
Recipients of ADC and of mothers' pension programs in particular were generally white
widows, a fact that reflects the pervasive attitude in the early twentieth century that public
assistance should only go to those who are "deserving"-those who are prevented from work
due to some type of burden (such as a disability or child-rearing) and not due to laziness. See
Forbath, supra note 7, at 1839. This narrow window of eligibility eventually broadened to
include all single mothers, whether widowed or not, who otherwise financially qualified for
ADC. See Sanger, supra, at 476.
17. See Forbath, supra note 7, at 1839-40 (discussing eligibility determinations and
particularly how the states kept poor black mothers in the South off the welfare rolls with
the rationale that there was always work available in the cotton fields).
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distribution of benefits, many states chose to keep benefit levels low
in order to discourage the "undeserving" poor" from becoming
overly dependent on public assistance. 9 Yet at the same time, ADC
signaled the federal government's first attempt to provide public
assistance to indigent Americans on a national level. It also
evidenced the New Deal government's dedication to the broader
goals of the Social Security Act of 1935: to provide a financial safety
net for all Americans and eventually to eradicate poverty in the
United States. Though the actual implementation of ADC by no
means achieved the New Dealers' ultimate goal of using"aggressive
spending on social welfare programs" to ensure "overall
prosperity,"20 it was nonetheless a program that was crucial for
laying the ideological foundation of public assistance in America.
B. A Transformation of Programs and Ideals
From the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935 through the
1960s, the number of Americans receivingADC gradually swelled.2
A 1962 amendment to the Social Security Act renamed the program
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), indicating that
the program would now provide assistance to impoverished parents
as well as children.22 Passed during the Kennedy administration,
the amendment established the first "welfare-to-work" programs
associated with AFDC and its successor programs, providing state
and local governments with the funds and discretion to implement
work programs that would reduce recipients' dependence on public
assistance.2
It was not until President Johnson declared War on Poverty in
1964, however, that the character of the AFDC program truly began
to change.24 In principle, "the thrust of the War on Poverty was to
18. See supra note 16 for a brief discussion of how states defined the poor as "deserving"
and "undeserving."
19. See supra note 17.
20. See McCluskey, supra note 16, at 802-03.
21. According to Gilens, 370,000 families received ADC in 1940, and by 1960, the
program benefited 800,000 families. GILENS, supra note 13, at 18.
22. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, tit. 4, 76 Stat. 172, 185
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
23. GILENS, supra note 13, at 179.
24. Id.
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provide alternatives to, rather than reforms of, welfare."' In
practice, the war translated mostly into an effort to move people off
the AFDC rolls and into the workforce.2 ' Amendments in 1967 to
the Social Security Act further solidified the national emphasis on
work that pervaded political discussions about the increasing
number of Americans receiving AFDC.27 President Johnson's War
on Poverty still retained the ideal that the way to move people off
AFDC and out of poverty was broader than work requirements and
included education, job training, and reorganization at the commu-
nity level. It was clear, however, that work requirements were the
only economically and politically feasible option.2"
Though the focus of AFDC reforms in the 1960s was on moving
recipients from welfare to work, the number of people on the
welfare rolls actually increased dramatically during the 1960s and
continued to do so until the mid 1970s.29 In response to this trend,
both the Nixon and Carter administrations attempted, but ulti-
mately failed, to replace AFDC with a national (rather than federal)
program"° that would ensure "a minimum basic income" for all
American families while retaining work requirements.3' Yet it was
President Reagan who successfully waged a direct attack on the
25. Id.
26. Id. at 179-80; see also Sanger, supra note 16, at 476-77.
27. For instance, the amendments established the Work Incentive Program (WIN), which
permitted states to extend work and job training requirements to recipient mothers of young
children so long as the states provided day care. Sonya Michel, A Tale of Two States: Race,
Gender, and Public IPrivate Welfare Provision in Postwar America, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
123, 130-31 (1997).
28. See Forbath, supra note 7, at 1846-48.
29. GILENS, supra note 13, at 18-19; Forbath, supra note 7, at 1841; Michel, supra note
27, at 131.
30. There is a subtle distinction between national and federal programs. The federal
government generally funds and administers national programs. However, with federal
programs, the federal government's role is usually limited to funding and regulation of the
states, with the states making their own determinations as to how to administer the
programs.
31. GILENS, supra note 13, at 180-81. Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan (FAP),
which would have had a much broader application than AFDC and would have provided
supplemental income to working as well as impoverished families, two-parent as well as
single-parent families, and male-headed as well as female-headed households. Forbath, supra
note 7, at 1854-55. Both liberals, who disliked the work requirements of FAP, and
conservatives, who disliked the funding increases for cash benefits and day care, jointly
killed the proposal. GILENS, supra note 13, at 181. Carter suggested a plan similar to Nixon's
FAP but likewise found insufficient support in Congress to pass any reform bills. Id. at 181.
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increasing welfare rolls by demanding that AFDC recipients meet
strict work requirements. 2 With the passage of the Family Support
Act (FSA) of 1988, 33 Reagan ended his presidency by reaffirming the
importance of the "welfare-to-work" aspect of public assistance.34
These changes in the structure of the AFDC program that began
in the early 1950s and that Reagan cemented in the late 1980s
reflect an important shift in the political conception of public
assistance in the United States. Much like the view that permeated
the politics of New Deal social-economic legislation, 5 the Kennedy
administration advocated for significant expenditures in the short
term that would result in a reduction in poverty in the long term.36
Indeed, Kennedy's proposition for reformation of AFDC focused on
broadening the pool of Americans eligible for benefits in order to
provide the necessary support-in the form of education, employ-
ment, medical care, and child care-for individuals to lift them-
selves out of poverty.37 Yet Congress ultimately shelved Kennedy's
proposal and instead passed the 1962 Amendment that conditioned
receipt of AFDC on fulfillment of certain work requirements, thus
"put[ting] federal welfare policy on the slippery slope toward
workfare."3M Although in the end Kennedy failed to provide AFDC
benefits to more Americans, he did propagate the ideal of the New
Deal that welfare reform meant more than getting people off public
assistance-it also meant providing the impoverished with the
means to get out of poverty.
Johnson's "War on Poverty" was the next step in the ideological
movement from welfare to workfare. As the emphasis of the 1967
Amendments on moving recipients from welfare to work reflects,
the War on Poverty inevitably signaled a war on AFDC recipients.
The goal of AFDC to keep mothers out of work and at home with
their children39 was losing support with most politicians as the
32. GILENS, supra note 13, at 181-82.
33. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (repealed 1996).
34. See GILENS, supra note 13, at 182; see also Sanger, supra note 16, at 476.
35. See supra text accompanying note 11.
36. See Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and
Welfare "Reform," 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 741, 746-47 (1993).
37. Id.
38. Michel, supra note 27, at 131.
39. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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welfare caseloads grew rapidly4' and particularly as society came to
accept the role of women in the workforce. 4'1 As employers gradually
opened their doors to more women, policymakers' expectations that
AFDC recipients should be self-sufficient grew, and politicians
consequently transformed AFDC from a program focused on
support to a program focused on work.4'2 Though the War on Poverty
theoretically propagated Roosevelt's legacy and Kennedy's concep-
tion of welfare,43 it abandoned those ideals to satisfy the concerns
of the public that AFDC recipients should turn to work and not
welfare for economic support.
President Reagan's attack on the American welfare state
solidified the transformation of AFDC from welfare to workfare.
44
As the Reagan administration pushed for even stronger work
requirements for recipients and less funding for the program, the
message became clear: single mothers need to rely on employment,
and not the government, to support themselves and their children. 5
Thus, the perception of AFDC's purpose had changed significantly
since its beginnings in the 1930s. Whereas Roosevelt, Kennedy, and
even Johnson had envisioned a large, generous welfare state that
would provide Americans with sufficient economic support in order
to eliminate poverty in the long run, by the time Reagan completed
his two terms in the White House, the mood had drastically shifted.
Politicians and the public no longer saw AFDC as a program for the
destitute who had befallen an unfortunate fate. Instead, it appeared
to have become a program of dependence that single mothers used
to avoid working to support themselves and particularly their
children.46 It is this perception of AFDC and its recipients that set
the stage for the extensive reform of the program in the 1990s.
40. See supra text accompanying note 29.
41. See GILENS, supra note 13, at 178-79.
42. See id. at 179; Sanger, supra note 16, at 476-77.
43. See supra text accompanying note 28.
44. See GLENS, supra note 13, at 181-82.
45. See, e.g., id.; Sanger, supra note 16, at 476.
46. See Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of
Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415, 426 (1999) (arguing that today's
conception of welfare recipients as divorced or single mothers who refuse to become self-
sufficient emerged during the Reagan administration).
2004]
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C. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996
The transformation of AFDC from a program of welfare to a
program of workfare culminated in the passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA).47 PRWORA is particularly significant legislation in
terms of welfare reform, because it replaced individual entitlement
to public assistance with block grants to the states.48 Consequently,
Americans are no longer "entitled" to receive public assistance, and
the states have much more discretion in their administration and
funding of welfare programs. 49 To signal the nature of this dramatic
reform of AFDC, Congress renamed the program Temporary Aid to
Needy Families (TANF).W Congress also imposed the most stringent
restrictions on AFDC recipients to date,51 while simultaneously
delegating significant eligibility and benefit decisions to the state
and local level.52 As President Clinton observed, the passage of
47. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 8
U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
48. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000). Specifically, § 601(b) states that PRWORA "shall not be interpreted
to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any State program funded under this
part." Id.; see also Kay P. Kindred, Of Child Welfare and Welfare Reform: The Implications
for Children When Contradictory Policies Collide, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 413, 413
(2003) (noting the significance of PRWORA's end to individual entitlement).
49. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: DATA AVAILABLE TO ASSESS
TANF'S PROGRESS 6, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01298.pdf (Feb. 2001); McCluskey,
supra note 16, at 808.
50. See McCluskey, supra note 16, at 808.
51. One such restriction is the five-year lifetime limit, which precludes states from using
federal TANF funds (though not other federal funds, nor state or local funds) to provide
public assistance to any individual who has already received a cumulative of over five years
of welfare throughout her lifetime (with a few exceptions). Id. Other restrictions include work
requirements, which condition states' receipt of federal TANF funds on the combined work
activity of their TANF recipients, a restriction that the state consequently passes on to those
recipients. Kindred, supra note 48, at 413; McCluskey, supra note 16, at 808.
52. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49, at 6. One eligibility requirement
that is now in the hands of the states mandates that recipients engage in educational work,
job training, and/or public service work, if employment is unavailable. See GILENS, supra
note 13, at 183. Examples of benefits that are at the states' discretion are benefits to unwed
teenage minor parents, as well as benefits subject to family cap and child exclusion laws. Id.
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PRWORA marked "the end of welfare as we know it"5 3 and the
beginning of a public assistance program centered on getting
Americans off welfare and back to work.
Explicit in PRWORA's emphasis on ending entitlement to welfare
and in its imposition of strict work requirements were the underly-
ing goals of the policymakers who passed the legislation. The most
prominent goal of PRWORA was to re-establish the importance of
marriage and family as a way to reduce Americans' dependency on
welfare. 5 This goal is particularly evident in the congressional
findings that national politicians used to justify the passage of
PRWORA.55 In these findings, Congress notes that: "(1) Marriage
is the foundation of a successful society. (2) Marriage is an essential
institution of a successful society which promotes the interests of
children. (3) Promotion of responsible fatherhood and motherhood
is integral to successful child rearing and the well-being of chil-
dren."56 As a corollary, PRWORA also sought to reduce the number
of out-of-wedlock births and, consequently, single-parent (particu-
larly single-mother) families, 7 emphasizing the detrimental impact
of these social trends on families as well as society.58 In sum,
policymakers used PRWORA to isolate and eliminate what they
saw as the root of American over-dependency on TANF: the social
dissolution of the nuclear family.
53. President Clinton first coined this phrase, which has commonly become associated
with the 1996 welfare reform. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, The Special Interest Gambit: How
Clinton Is Changing the Democratic Discourse, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1993, at C1.
54. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (2000). For discussions of PRWORA's emphasis on marriage and family as
the key to self-sufficiency for welfare recipients, see Kindred, supra note 48, at 414; Harry
Murray, Dorothy Day, Welfare Reform, and Personal Responsibility, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
789, 803 (1999).
55. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 101, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110-12 (1996).
56. Id. at § 101(1)-(3), 110 Stat. at 2110.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 601(aX3)-(4) (2000). In fact, PRWORA took this goal so seriously that it
"created a bonus of up to $100 million per year for states that substantially reduced rates of
out-of-wedlock births and that did not increase abortion rates in the process." Tim Ransdell
& Shervin Boloorian, Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., Federal Formula Grants and California: TANF
and Welfare Programs 15, http://www.ppic.org/contentlother/ 1202TANFandWelfare.pdf(Dec.
2002).
58. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 101(5)-(6), (8), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110-11 (1996).
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Aside from attacking welfare dependency as a product of single
parenthood, policymakers also focused more broadly on ways that
PRWORA could reduce the number of people on public assistance.
The concern that arose in earlier decades that far too many
Americans were dependent on welfare59 surfaced again in the 1996
reform. A Senate proceeding in late 1995 that concerned the
pending welfare reform bill stressed that entitlement to public
assistance had bred dependency and that only by creating incen-
tives for people to work rather than rely on welfare could
policymakers hope to reduce AFDC caseloads.60 Indeed, one of the
central tenets of PRWORA was that Americans must learn to view
public assistance as "temporary," a fact most evident in the retitling
of AFDC as TANF.61 The extensive work requirements that TANF
imposed on states and recipients62 also exemplify Congress's desire
to decrease the number of welfare recipients. Thus, PRWORA was
not just a national effort to strengthen the American family; it was
also an attempt to reduce the number of Americans who receive
public assistance.
Finally, and most subtly, PRWORA was yet another attempt to
reform welfare in order to reduce poverty among Americans. The
early 1980s and early 1990s saw the highest rate of poverty since
the mid-1960s,63 reflective of the fact that the income disparity
between the rich and the poor grew at a faster rate during the
1980s and 1990s than it had since World War II.64 Though Congress
intended the Family Support Act of 1988 to solve much of this
problem,6" it became evident to Republicans and Democrats alike
that more drastic welfare reform was necessary.66 According to the
government, the solution to the recent rise in poverty was PRWORA
59. See discussion supra Part I.B.
60. 141 CONG. REC. S19,086-87 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995).
61. Other federal government publications also underscore this theme of temporariness.
See, e.g., id.; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49, at 6.
62. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
63. By the early 1990s, the poverty rate was slightly above 15%. GILENS, supra note 13,
at 20 fig.1.3.
64. Id. at 20.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
66. See GILENS, supra note 13, at 182.
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and particularly the reogranization of AFDC into TANF.67 Indeed,
PRWORA's heavy emphasis on work suggests that the purpose of
the legislation was not only to reduce the number of recipients of
public assistance but also to lift people out of poverty." Although
the focus of the 1996 reform was clearly on promoting family values
and decreasing dependency on welfare, policymakers passed
PRWORA, like it did most other welfare reform legislation,
ultimately to achieve the goal that has its roots in the creation of
the American welfare state in the 1930s: the reduction of poverty
among Americans.
As the above discussion illustrates, the welfare program in the
United States has undergone a serious transformation since its
inception during the New Deal. At the time that Roosevelt created
ADC in the 1930s, he envisioned a program that would act as a net
of financial support to needy Americans and that would eventually
be so successful that it would necessitate the end of its own
existence. Yet the economy made Roosevelt's ideals more of a
dream, and his successors struggled for decades to create a system
that provided for indigent Americans while also fostering self-
sufficiency and a strong work ethic among welfare recipients.
PRWORA has attempted to end this struggle by cementing the
concepts of work, family, and marriage as the solution to eradicat-
ing dependency on TANF and to reducing poverty. However,
PRWORA brought with it several other significant changes in the
administration of public assistance and, in doing so, allowed the
states to adopt measures of "welfare reform" that are so far
removed from the ideals on which PRWORA and the American
welfare state were built. The remainder of this Note discusses one
of these measures-family cap laws-and how their implementation
has failed to further the goals they are supposed to achieve.
67. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, Letter to the Senate Finance Committee Urging
Opposition to Personal Responsibility and Individual Development for Everyone Act of 2003
(PRIDE), http://www.aclu.org/PoorRights/PoorRights.cfin?ID=-13521&c=154 (Sept. 10, 2003)
(noting that "PRIDE [The Personal Responsibility and Individual Development for Everyone
Act of 2003] adopts poverty reduction as a primary purpose of TANF").
68. See sources cited supra note 7 for a discussion of the link between employment and
the reduction of poverty.
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II. FAMILY CAP LAWS
In the 1962 amendment to the Social Security Act, 9 Congress
created a provision that empowers the Secretary of the United
States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to grant
a state's request to implement "any experimental, pilot, or demon-
stration project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to
assist in promoting the objectives" of the Act.7" If the Secretary
grants the state's request, it is considered a waiver, because the
Secretary has waived the state's mandatory compliance with the
federal rules of administration of public assistance programs as set
forth in the Social Security Act.7 States have used this provision
over the years to create new approaches to old problems within the
welfare system, but one waiver in particular has become quite
controversial-family cap, or child exclusion, laws. These provisions
deny TANF families the incremental increase in benefits they
normally receive under TANF for each child in their household.72
The following Part of this Note provides a brief review of these laws
and explains the states' purposes in implementing them.
A. A Brief Synopsis of Family Cap Laws
Though often used interchangeably, the terms "family cap" and
"child exclusion" have subtle differences. Under a strict interpreta-
tion of these terms, family cap laws place a ceiling on the amount
of TANF benefits that any family can receive, regardless of the
number of children in that family, whereas child exclusion laws
provide benefits to families but refuse to increase the amount of
those benefits if the mother gives birth to another child while on
TANF.73 Evident in the blurred line that separates these two types
69. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2000).
71. See, e.g., Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 36, at 742 (describing this provision of the
Social Security Act as a "waiver").
72. See discussion infra Part II.A.
73. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Standardsfor Constitutional Review ofPrivacy-Invading
Welfare Reforms: Distinguishing the Abortion-Funding Cases and Redeeming the Undue-




of laws, the differences between family cap and child exclusion laws
are more conceptual than practical. Conceptually speaking, these
laws may implicate constitutional issues differently,74 but in
practice they have a similar effect: a denial of TANF benefits that
are proportional to the size of the family. Thus, though family cap
and child exclusion laws have slightly different applications to
TANF families, the analysis in this Note applies to both types of
legislation and, for convenience, will refer to them collectively as
family cap laws.
While all family cap laws rest on the same pretext-that TANF
families should not receive an increase in benefits when the mother
gives birth to an additional child-they vary considerably among
the states that apply them. As of February 2003, twenty-three
states had implemented some form of family cap legislation under
waiver from the Secretary of HHS.75 Most of these states have the
simplest form of family cap laws-a complete denial of an increase
in cash benefits for additional children.7" A few states with family
cap laws still grant an increase in cash benefits to the family when
the additional child is born, but that increase is less than the
proportional amount of benefits the family would receive for that
child if the family had the child before they started to receive
TANF.77 Finally, a few states replace an increase in cash benefits
with vouchers that families can use to buy only particular items,
such as food or clothing.7" These three approaches characterize the
74. One constitutional difference is that, under an equal protection analysis, family cap
laws "treat[ I] all similarly situated families alike," but child exclusion laws "discriminate
among families of identical size and need" on the basis of the timing of the children's birth.
Id.; see also Risa E. Kaufman, State ERAs in the New Era: Securing Poor Women's Equality
by Eliminating Reproductive-Based Discrimination, 24 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 200 n.47,
208 (2001) (discussing the same constitutional distinction between family cap and child
exclusion laws).
75. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Admin. for Children and Families, Office of
Family Assistance, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): Fifth Annual Report
to Congress, ch. 12, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programsofaannualreport5/chapl2.htm (Feb.
2003).
76. State Policy Documentation Project, Summary of Policy Issues: Reproductive Health
Provisions and Teen Requirements, http://www.spdp.org/reprexpl.htm#famcap (Oct. 13,
1999).
77. Id.
78. Anna Marie Smith, The SexualRegulation Dimension ofContemporary Welfare Law:
A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 176 (2002) (discussing the voucher
systems that several different states use).
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types of family cap provisions that states have generally imple-
mented.
Aside from the different approaches to the basic application of
family cap provisions, there are other variations in family cap laws
among the states that use them. One of the more common provi-
sions is the grace period, which essentially is a "softener" that
prevents the application of the family cap law to mothers who give
birth to their children shortly after receiving TANF.79 Many states
also provide for rape or incest exemptions within their state
provisions, though some states, like California and Florida, set
strict standards that require the mother to prove rape or incest
before the exemption will apply.' Some states also provide
exemptions for mothers who bear children because their contracep-
tion failed."1 In addition to the few exemptions described here, there
are many other benefits and restrictions that states often impose on
families who are subject to family cap laws. 2 In general, however,
all family cap provisions essentially function in the same man-
ner-they deny some kind of benefit to families who give birth to
children while receiving TANF.
Whether to impose family cap restrictions on welfare recipients
has always been an issue for the states to resolve. TANF delegates
much more authority to the states than AFDC, however, and thus
the 1996 reform has significantly limited federal authority over
family cap laws. Before the passage of PRWORA, a state would
request the Secretary of HHS to grant it a special waiver to
79. See NOW Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Background on Child Exclusion
Proposals, httpJ/www.nowldef.org/html/issues/wel/childep.shtml (Apr. 2000); State Policy
Documentation Project, supra note 76. Most states have a ten-month grace period, although
at least Nebraska has a shorter grace period of three months. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-504(2)
(2003); NOW Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, supra; State Policy Documentation Project, supra
note 76.
80. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04(bX1) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 414.115(2)(a)
(2000); Smith, supra note 78, at 177; NOW Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, supra note 79.
81. California, at least, only provides this exemption for families whose failed
contraception was not due to human mistake but instead was a surgically imposed method
that failed, such as an intrauterine device, Norplant, or sterilization. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 11450.04(bX3) (West 2001); State Policy Documentation Project, supra note 76.
82. For further examples of state variations of family cap laws, see Smith, supra note 78,
at 174-77; NOW Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, supra note 79; State Policy Documentation
Project, supra note 76.
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implement a family cap law;8" thus, the process was state initiated
and federally approved.84 In the late 1980s, however, this process
began to change, 5 and states eagerly accepted President Bush's
"invit[ation] ... to submit waiver requests to 'promote experiments
with welfare reform.'" 6 With the passage of PRWORA and the
establishment of TANF as a block-grant program, the federal
government further extended this invitation by allowing states to
implement family cap laws without any federal approval and with
"almost complete discretion." 7 Thus, the states now have the
freedom to create and define any family cap provision they wish, so
long as it does not otherwise violate the Social Security Act, and the
federal government has essentially relinquished its authority over
these highly controversial laws.
B. The Principles Behind Family Cap Laws
Beginning largely in the 1980s,88 states began to use family cap
laws as a means of welfare reform. In implementing these laws,
states have several objectives in mind, including: reducing the
incentives for welfare mothers to bear children while on public
assistance; encouraging self-sufficiency and discouraging depend-
ency on the government; and, by the time of PRWORA, promoting
marriage and family values. In essence, states view family cap laws
as one way to solve the perceived problems that have plagued the
public assistance program in America for years.
One of the goals of family cap laws is to provide welfare mothers
with appropriate incentives to bear fewer children, 9 to assume
83. Social Security Act of 1988 § 1115,42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2000); supra notes 70-71 and
accompanying text.
84. See Smith, supra note 78, at 168-69; NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra
note 79; State Policy Documentation Project, supra note 76.
85. ANN HORVATH & H. ELzABETH PETERS, WELFARE WAIVERS AND NON-MARITAL
CHILDBEARING, (Joint Ctr. for Poverty Research Working Paper 1999) No. 128, httpJ/www.
jcpr.org//wp/Wpprofile.cfm?ID=133.
86. Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 36, at 742.
87. NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 79.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
89. Yvette Marie Barksdale, And the Poor Have Children: A Harm-Based Analysis of
Family Caps and the Hollow Procreative Rights of Welfare Beneficiaries, 14 LAW & INEQ. 1,
4-5 (1995); Am. Civil Liberties Union, Background Briefing: The Civil Liberties Issues of
Welfare Reform (Apr. 14, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/ReproductiveRights/Reproductive
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responsibility for themselves and their families, 90 and to avoid
dependency on public assistance. 9' These incentives are largely
interwoven. Presumably, family caps will dissuade women on TANF
from having children, because these women will recognize that
they will no longer receive additional public assistance to help pay
for those children.92 Instead, family caps encourage recipients to
take responsibility for their lives, their children's lives, and their
financial situation, enabling them to cut the chains of dependency
on welfare. Inherent in this line of reasoning is the idea "that poor
women make reproductive decisions in an entrepreneurial profit-
seeking manner, and that negative financial incentives constitute
the best remedies."93 Hence, states design family cap laws to
encourage indigent women to make "appropriate" decisions as to
bearing children while receiving public assistance.
Another goal of family cap laws is to promote the traditional
social values of marriage and family. As was evident when Congress
debated and passed PRWORA, policymakers in the 1980s and
1990s became increasingly concerned with the moral values that
the American welfare system was propagating.94 Family cap laws
proved to ease some of their concern. By discouraging women on
TANF from having children they cannot financially support, the
presumption is that family cap laws will thereby decrease the
incidence of out-of-wedlock births among welfare recipients. 95 Thus,
family cap laws appear to be a way to reinforce the idea that
Rights.cfm?lD=9041&c=146; NOW Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, supra note 79.
90. See C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1014 (D.N.J. 1995) (recognizing New Jersey's
family cap law as rationally providing AFDC recipients with an incentive to assume personal
responsibility).
91. Edward M. Wayland, Welfare Reform in Virginia: A Work in Progress, 3 VA. J. Soc.
POLY & L. 249, 292 (1996).
92. See C.K, 883 F. Supp. at 1014 (acknowledging that family cap laws promote self-
sufficiency and may discourage women from having children they cannot afford).
93. Smith, supra note 78, at 174; see also Susan Frelich Appleton, When Welfare Reforms
Promote Abortion: "Personal Responsibility," "Family Values,' and the Right to Choose, 85
GEO. L.J. 155, 159 (1996) (explaining that a common perception of AFDC recipients was that
of single mothers who repeatedly had children in order to receive more public assistance from
the state).
94. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
95. Appleton, supra note 73, at 159; Barksdale, supra note 89, at 15.
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marriage and two-parent families promote personal responsibility
among welfare recipients.9
States have adopted family cap laws largely in response to
the "welfare crisis" of the latter part of this century.97 As AFDC
caseloads boomed and single-motherhood became an acceptable
societal norm that was apparently ousting marriage from the values
of welfare recipients, 98 policymakers grasped for some instrument
to reform the failing system. One of the instruments they found was
family cap legislation. Through family cap laws, states can regulate
their public assistance programs in such a way as to discourage the
supposed abuse of and dependency on AFDC that had engulfed
recipients in the past. With PRWORA's devolution of authority over
waiver programs like family cap laws from the federal to state
level, family cap legislation became an even more attractive
means for welfare reform. Yet two questions still remain. The
first question is whether family cap laws unconstitutionally burden
welfare recipients, which the next Part discusses. The question that
follows is-even if the courts do view these laws as constitu-
tional-are family cap laws truly an effective way for states to
reform the American welfare system? This Note will strive to
answer this question in its final section.99
III. CHALLENGES IN THE COURTS TO FAMILY CAP LEGISLATION
As implementation of family cap laws spread quickly through the
United States during the 1980s and 1990s, opposition to the
legislation quickly mounted, and opponents took to the courts for
resolution. In particular, opponents of family cap laws have argued
that state family cap legislation is unconstitutional under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine-a doctrine that the Supreme
96. Appleton, supra note 73, at 159.
97. Numerous scholars have referred to the recent developments in America's public
assistance program as evidencing a perceived "welfare 'crisis.'" See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis &
Cheryl M. Miller, Welfare Waiting Periods: A Public Policy Analysis of Saenza v. Roe, 11
STAN. L. & POL'YREV. 343,343 (2000) (labeling PRWORA as a response to the late twentieth-
century "welfare 'crisis'"); Joel F. Handler, The "Third Way" or the Old Way?, 48 U. KAN. L.
REV. 765,781 (2000) (pointing to AFDC as being at "the center of the contemporary welfare
crisis').
98. See discussion supra Part I.B.
99. See discussion infra Part IV.
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Court developed to assess the constitutionality of conditions that
the government places on receipt of a government benefit. Yet
historically this doctrine has been of little assistance in challenging
government restrictions on benefits, because over the years the
Supreme Court has refined the application of the doctrine to public
assistance cases such that it has adopted a position quite deferen-
tial to the states in their administration of benefits. Several recent
decisions by federal and state courts illustrate this deference well.
Even more importantly, these recent challenges to family cap laws
demonstrate that opponents of the legislation cannot rely on the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to argue that these laws should
be overturned. Instead, these challenges indicate that opponents
must turn away from the courts (and toward the legislatures, as the
last part of this Note addresses) in order to have family caps
eliminated as a means of welfare reform.
A. The History of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine reflects the judiciary's
assertion that government control often must heed to individuals'
rights. The courts created the doctrine during the Lochner era in
response to the government's overwhelming regulation of commerce
among the states. 00 Under the doctrine, the government cannot
place a condition on any benefit that it provides, even if it is under
no obligation to provide those benefits, if that condition violates
an individual's constitutional right.10' The affected constitutional
right, however, must be one that hinges on the individual's
"exercise of autonomous choice."0 2 Thus, the Lochner-era courts
100. Laura M. Friedman, Comment, Family Cap and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine: Scrutinizing a Welfare Woman's Right to Bear Children, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 644
(1995).
101. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413,1415
(1989); see also Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1193-94 (1990) (discussing the
principle behind the doctrine). Because the doctrine considers the effect of the conditional
benefit on the individual's constitutional right, the courts review these cases under the strict
scrutiny standard. Sullivan, supra, at 1422.
102. Sullivan, supra note 101, at 1426. Examples of constitutional rights that involve the
.exercise of autonomous choice" include an individual's First Amendment right to speech or
the exercise of religion, a business's right to participate in interstate commerce, and a state's
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used the doctrine to prohibit the government from placing any such
unconstitutional conditions on the states' rights to engage in
commerce.
The rigorous application of substantive due process that charac-
terized the Lochner courts' handling of economic liberty cases soon
dissipated, but the courts held onto the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine and began to apply it to individual rights cases. 103 As the
New Deal ushered in an era of extensive social and economic
legislation, the necessity for the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine escalated. 10 4 The Court subsequently applied the doctrine
in two significant cases, Speiser v. Randall1" 5 and Sherbert v.
Verner,"~ and thereby affirmed that the doctrine did indeed protect
from governmental intrusion an individual's right to exercise
choice.107 Moreover, in Sherbert, the court applied the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine to a public assistance case for the first
time.'0 8 Thus, the stage was finally set for the Court to fully
consider the application of the doctrine to government-imposed
conditions on receipt of public assistance.
From the late 1960s on, the Court decided a number of cases that
involved conditions that states had imposed on welfare recipients.
right to self-govern.
103. Friedman, supra note 100, at 645.
104. Id.
105. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). In Speiser, the Court held that a state could not condition a
veteran's receipt of a property-tax exemption on his recitation of a loyalty oath, because it
violated the veteran's First Amendment right to exercise his choice of speech. Id. at 518-19;
Sullivan, supra note 101, at 1433.
106. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court applied the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to an individual's First Amendment right to exercise her religion freely, holding that
the state acted unconstitutionally when it failed to give unemployment benefits to a woman
who had lost her job due to her refusal to work on the Sabbath. Id. at 410; Sullivan, supra
note 101, at 1434.
107. Sullivan, supra note 101, at 1433-34.
108. Baker, supra note 101, at 1186.
109. See Forbath, supra note 7, at 1862. One of the most important decisions involving the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In
Shapiro, the Court applied the doctrine to a state restriction requiring welfare recipients to
live in the state for at least one year prior to applying for welfare benefits. Id. at 622. The
Court found the restriction unconstitutional, because it penalized "the fundamental right of
interstate movement" and because the government had not adequately asserted a compelling
interest in the restriction. Id. at 634, 638; Baker, supra note 101, at 1209; Sullivan, supra
note 101, at 1434.
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Many of these decisions sharply limited permissible governmental
restrictions, establishing "a no-strings, no-stigma, national right to
welfare.""' In the 1970 case of Dandridge v. Williams,"' however,
the Court upheld an important restriction on AFDC recipients-the
family cap." 2 In deciding Dandridge, the Court declined to use
strict scrutiny review and instead declared that economic and social
welfare legislation would now be subject only to a reasonable
basis standard of review"'-and under this standard, Maryland's
family cap legislation was constitutional."" The Court also upheld
significant governmental restrictions in Maher v. Roe"' and Harris
v. McRae 6 by asserting that the government could choose to extend
Medicaid coverage for a woman's expenses for childbirth but not for
expenses for abortion without violating a woman's constitutional
procreative rights."7 Clearly, though the precedent of Sherbert
suggested that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may
protect welfare recipients from restrictions on their access to public
assistance, Dandridge, Maher, and Harris reflect the Court's
willingness to defer to the government's judgment and uphold
conditions on the receipt of welfare as constitutional.
The Supreme Court developed the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as an instrument to keep governmental regulation of
economic rights in check. The Court has since developed the
doctrine far past its roots, coming to apply it to cases in which a
government condition infringes upon an individual's constitutional
right to choose a given course of action. The line of cases detailed
above explains the evolution of the doctrine in reference to
conditions-including family cap legislation-that restrict receipt
of public assistance, and it indicates that the Court is not eager to
110. Forbath, supra note 7, at 1862.
111. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
112. At issue in Dandridge was Maryland's family cap law, which set the maximum
benefit that any family of any size could receive at $250 per month; the plaintiffs argued the
case as an equal protection claim. Id. at 474, 483; Barksdale, supra note 89, at 21-22.
113. Baker, supra note 101, at 1210.
114. Barksdale, supra note 89, at 22.
115. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
116. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
117. Barksdale, supra note 89, at 22-23. Part of the Court's rationale was that the
government was simply choosing not to fund abortions and that it was not conditioning the
woman s receipt of Medicaid on her procreative choices. Id. at 23.
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find the conditioning of such benefits unconstitutional. Yet these
earlier cases did not assure the federal and state governments that
the more complex family cap laws of the 1980s and 1990s would
withstand constitutional challenge, and opponents of family cap
legislation soon forced the judiciary to pick a side in the constitu-
tional debate.
B. Point and Counterpoint in the Constitutional Debate over
Family Cap Laws
Undaunted by the Court's decision in Dandridge and the
"unconstitutional conditions" cases that followed it, opponents of
family cap legislation waged a new attack on the laws in the 1990s.
They developed a theme for their challenges in court: they argued
that family cap laws infringe on a woman's constitutional rights to
privacy and procreation. Opponents assert that states with family
cap laws do more than refuse to subsidize a woman's procreative
rights; instead, they harm welfare recipients by penalizing their
decision to bear children while receiving welfare."' Thus, by
implementing these laws, the government is trying to control the
reproductive choices of TANF recipients. 9 Under this characteriza-
tion of family cap laws, courts should apply strict scrutiny review
to the legislation, and in doing so, they will find the laws unconsti-
tutional. 20 Thus, opponents of family cap legislation assert that the
laws are clearly unconstitutional, because they infringe upon a
woman's right to choose when to procreate.
The federal and state government responded to the opposition by
staunchly defending the constitutionality of family cap laws, largely
referring back to the same arguments advanced (and usually
sanctioned) in cases like Dandridge, Maher, and Harris. The
government asserts that family cap laws are rationally related to
118. Barksdale, supra note 89, at 24-26; Friedman, supra note 100, at 650.
119. See Appleton, supra note 73, at 23; Barksdale, supra note 89, at 28-29. One scholar
asserts that family caps "unleash[] the power of the legislature to oppressively control the
constitutional rights of the poor who depend upon government largesse for survival."
Barksdale, supra note 89, at 28.
120. Appleton, supra note 73, at 23; Barksdale, supra note 89, at 25-26.
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the purposes they are set out to achieve.12' Specifically, the goals of
family cap laws are to reduce the number of "children born into a
dependent situation," to increase recipients' ability to work outside
the home, and thereby to promote personal responsibility among
TANF recipients.122 The government also claims that because the
Constitution does not provide an economic right to welfare, the
states have tremendous latitude in administering public assistance
programs.' 23 This position harkens back to the Court's decision in
Dandridge and calls for deferential review of welfare legislation. 24
A third argument is perhaps the most provocative-that the
government can choose not to subsidize certain behaviors without
violating the individual's corresponding constitutional right. '25 This
argument is reminiscent of the Court's holdings in Maher and
Harris and equates family cap laws with mere refusals to subsidize
rather than with penalties or burdens. 2 With each of these
arguments-and much precedent to support them-the government
has aggressively defended its implementation of family cap
legislation.
C. The Judicial Response
Opponents of family cap legislation challenged the constitutional-
ity of the laws in several recent cases, with the federal and state
governments firmly maintaining that the laws do indeed meet the
constitutional requirements of equal protection and due process. As
the Supreme Court had not issued a decision on the constitutional-
ity of family cap legislation since the time ofDandridge, '27 the issue
was ripe for litigation. That litigation began in the federal and state
121. See N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103,1109 (Ind. App. 2000) ("The State asserts that
the family cap is rationally related to its legitimate interest in altering the cycle of welfare
dependency.").
122. N.B., 724 N.E.2d at 1109.
123. See Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 36, at 764.
124. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
125. See Barksdale, supra note 89, at 28-29.
126. See id. at 24-26; supra note 117 and accompanying text.




courts in New Jersey, and it arose again in Indiana. 128 As the
courts, one by one, made their decisions, it became clear that the
courts were unwilling to depart from the legacy of Dandridge,
Maher, and Harris.
Opponents first attacked the New Jersey family cap law under
the Federal Constitution in C.K v. New Jersey Department of
Health and Human Services.129 In C.K, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' contention that the HHS Secretary violated due process
and equal protection by granting New Jersey's request for a family
cap waiver, finding that the Secretary's decision to grant the waiver
was not "arbitrary or capricious."3 ° The court also found that the
state's family cap "is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose"'3 1 and that it did not unduly burden a welfare recipient's
procreative choice but instead simply refused to subsidize that
choice.1 2 Lastly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' characterization
of the New Jersey law as a child exclusion law that discriminates
among AFDC families according to the timing of their children's
births, choosing to instead characterize the law as a family cap
similar to the one sanctioned in Dandridge.' As a result, the
federal circuit court agreed with the government that New Jersey's
family cap legislation is constitutional.
Seven years later in Sojourner A. v. New Jersey Department of
Human Services, opponents in New Jersey challenged the state's
family cap law as amended post-PRWORA, this time on the basis
that it violated due process and equal protection under the state
constitution.'34 The Supreme Court of New Jersey disagreed,
finding that the state's purposes of decreasing welfare dependency
and increasing self-sufficiency were legitimate and that the family
cap law rationally achieved those goals. 3 The court also inter-
128. See C.K. v. N.J. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996);
Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 828 A.2d 306 (N.J. 2003); N.B. v. Sybinski, 724
N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. App. 2000).
129. 92 F.3d 171, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1996).
130. Id. at 187-88.
131. Id. at 194.
132. See id. at 194-95.
133. See id. at 192. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text for further information
on the constitutional distinction between family cap and child exclusion laws.
134. 828 A.2d 306, 308 (N.J. 2003).
135. See id. at 311, 316.
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preted the provision as a refusal to subsidize and found that it did
not unduly burden a woman's right to make her own procreative
choices.'36 Largely basing its opinion on the circuit court's decision
in C.K, the state supreme court refused to sustain opponents'
second constitutional challenge to the state's family cap provision.
Opponents of family cap legislation have also attempted to
challenge family cap laws under the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in Indiana. In N.B. v. Sybinski, plaintiffs challenged an
Indiana provision that provides for an exemption that does not deny
an increase in TANF benefits for a child born to a family already
receiving assistance if the child is not living with that family but
rather with another caretaker. 7 The Indiana appellate court found
that the provision did not impact welfare recipients' fundamental
right of family association, because it did not require (nor coerce, as
the plaintiffs' contended) TANF families to give their child to a
friend or relative in order to gain access to full public assistance
benefits."s The court also found that Indiana had asserted legiti-
mate state interests in implementing this provision-increasing
personal responsibility among welfare recipients and reducing
dependency on the government-and that the law was rationally
related to those interests.'39 As a result, the Indiana court upheld
the state provision as constitutional.
These decisions by the New Jersey and Indiana courts strongly
support the states' implementation of family cap laws and leave
opponents with little hope of asserting a successful constitutional
challenge against the government in the future. In C.K, Sojourner
A., and N.B., the courts did not question the government's objec-
tives in instituting family cap laws; instead, they accepted the goals
of decreasing welfare dependency and increasing self-sufficiency as
the states' only purposes in implementing family cap laws.'" The
136. See id. at 315-17.
137. See 724 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (Ind. App. 2000).
138. See id. at 1108-09.
139. Id. at 1109-11.
140. See Linda Kelly, Reproductive Liberty Under the Threat of Care: Deputizing Private
Agents and Deconstructing State Action, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 81, 103 (1998) (noting that
the district court in C.K. accepted the state's assertion that family caps aim to encourage
personal responsibility and the values of marriage and family). In particular, the courts
failed even to consider the possibility that states were attempting to control the procreative
choices of women on welfare through family cp legislation. See Jill Elaine Hasday,
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courts also ignored the issue of "the normative validity of subjecting
women receiving ADC (or now TANF) to forms of interventionist
and instrumental regulation wholly at odds with the norms
governing the rest of family law. It was simply a moot issue.
Like the Supreme Court's holdings in Maher and Harris, the courts
in C.K, Sojourner A., and N.B. reiterated that the government did
not burden or penalize a woman's procreative choice merely because
it did not subsidize it. 142 The New Jersey and Indiana courts were
far from receptive to the plaintiffs' claims that family cap laws are
unconstitutional, and there is no doubt that these decisions, along
with the Supreme Court's decision in Dandridge, have dissuaded
many opponents of family cap laws from pursuing litigation in the
courts.143 Considering the judiciary's reluctance to find that family
cap laws unconstitutionally burden welfare recipients, opponents
of family cap legislation have but one choice left-abandon the
litigious strategy and persuade policymakers that family caps are
ineffective tools of welfare reform. By turning their efforts to the
legislators, opponents of family caps may have their only chance at
convincing the government that these laws simply do not work and
need to be abolished.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE Focus
By leaving behind the battle over the constitutionality of family
cap laws, opponents of this legislation can focus on a more attain-
able and feasible goal: persuading policymakers that family cap
laws should no longer be used because they are an ineffective way
to reform the American welfare state. This argument stems from
three separate but linked analyses: that family cap laws do not
meet their own goals; that they do not meet the goals of PRWORA;
and, most significantly, that they do not meet the goals of the
American welfare system. This Note has already considered the
Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEo.
L.J. 299, 384 (2002) (criticizing the New Jersey courts' decisions as ignorant of the true
motives and consequences of family cap legislation).
141. Hasday, supra note 140, at 384.
142. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Assisted Suicide and Reproductive Freedom: Exploring
Some Connections, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 15,26 n.82 (1998).
143. See Hasday, supra note 140, at 383.
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objectives of family cap laws,""' of PRWORA,'45 and of the American
welfare system.'" The remaining analysis addresses how well
family cap laws serve these purposes and concludes that this
legislation fails to meet most, if not all, of these goals.
A. Meeting Their Own Goals
In implementing family cap laws, states have recited two primary
goals that they feel family caps can achieve, at least in part. The
first of these objectives really involves three intertwined goals: to
encourage TANF mothers to have fewer children, to assume
personal responsibility, and to escape dependency on public
assistance.47 The second objective is to promote the values of
marriage and family among TANF recipients, which in turn will
reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock births.'" Analysis reflects,
however, that family cap laws do not logically achieve these goals.
Family cap laws do not provide welfare mothers with incentives
to bear fewer children, to assume personal responsibility, or to
avoid dependency on public assistance. As to the first incentive-to
bear fewer children-studies "almost universally agree" that women
on welfare do not bear additional children in order to increase
their benefits. 49 Additionally, welfare families, on average, have
the same number of children as the average American family.' 50
Hence, the decrease in benefits under family cap laws for additional
144. See discussion supra Part II.B.
145. See discussion supra Part I.C.
146. See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
147. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
149. See Wayland, supra note 91, at 295. Wayland cites an impressive string of studies
that support this conclusion. See id. at 295 n.281. He notes, in particular, two studies that
lend enhanced credibility to the conclusion that welfare benefits do not affect women's
childbearing decisions. The first study is that of Mary Jo Bane and David T. Ellwood, the
former Clinton administration officials who left office in protest of the welfare reform of the
1990s and who are widely respected scholars of welfare law. See id. at 295; see also Mr.
Clinton's Welfare Harvest, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1996, at A26 (reporting the resignations
and departures of appointed Clinton administration officials in response to the 1996 welfare
reform bill). The second study is that of Charles Murray, who Wayland describes "as one of
the most influential conservative critics of the welfare system" and who admitted that public
assistance programs do not cause most of the births to single-mother recipients. Wayland,
supra note 91, at 295 & n.282.
150. See id. at 296; Friedman, supra note 100, at 657-58; Smith, supra note 78, at 170-71.
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children does not persuade TANF women to have smaller families,
because an increase in benefits apparently is not one of the reasons
that women on welfare have children and because these women do
not-have larger families in the first place.15'
The second and third incentives that family cap laws aim to
provide to welfare mothers also appear misplaced. These incen-
tives-for women receiving TANF to assume personal responsibility
and to avoid dependency on welfare-presume that women rely on
public assistance benefits because they are readily accessible and
that their dependency will end only when the government forces
these women to "take responsibility" by supporting themselves and
their families. Yet these presumptions overstate the availability of
benefits and overshadow the reality that most welfare recipients
are temporary, not long-term, recipients who have come to rely on
TANF due to significant lifestyle changes.'52 Such lifestyle changes
result in women falling back on public assistance due to insufficient
low-wage work, divorce, inadequate child support, and a number of
other factors.' Once on welfare, most recipients must rely on other
income sources, such as employment, to supplement the meager
151. An important corollary to this point is that statistical studies are inconclusive as to
whether family cap laws actually reduce the number of children born to women on public
assistance. Some studies show an increase in abortion rates and a decrease in fertility rates
in states that have family cap laws. See HORVATH & PETERS, supra note 85; NOW Legal Def.
and Educ. Fund, Update on Recent Child Exclusion Developments, http://www.nowldef.
orglhtmlissuestwel/chexdv.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). Other studies show that family
cap laws have no effect on fertility rates. See Mary R. Mannix et al., Welfare Litigation
Developments Since the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, 31 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 435, 447 (1998), available at httpJ/www.welfarelaw.org/
artcommw.html; Smith, supra note 78, at 171-72.
152. See Friedman, supra note 100, at 658-59. Lifestyle changes that result independence
on welfare often involve a single-parent who newly assumes sole responsibility for a child,
whether due to divorce or simply due to the birth of a child into a single-parent household.
Id.
153. See, e.g., Susan L. Thomas, "Ending Welfare as We Know It," or Farewell to the Rights
of Women on Welfare? A Constitutional and Human Rights Analysis of The Personal
ResponsibilityAct, 78 U. DET. MERCYL. REv. 179,184 (2001) (noting that divorce, inadequate
child support, and low-wage work are often the causes of poverty and welfare dependence
among women); Laura M. Vogel, Children in Poverty: Welfare and Work Together Can Make
a Difference, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 173, 175-76 (1994) (emphasizing that low-wage work,
poor health care coverage, insufficient child support, and expensive day care contribute to
women becoming dependent on public assistance).
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welfare benefits they receive. " Thus, women generally do not avoid
responsibility by depending on welfare; instead, they use welfare as
one of several crutches to support themselves and their families. 55
The government misinterprets women's dependency on welfare
as a semi-permanent avoidance of responsibility rather than what
it truly is-a temporary use of a financial safety net in difficult
financial times. As a result, family cap laws cannot solve the
dependency problem and increase personal responsibility among
TANF recipients."S
Family cap laws also do not promote marriage and family values
among welfare recipients. The idea that a reduction in benefits will
encourage marriage and two-parent families rests on several
assumptions, all of which are flawed. The first assumption is that
women will be more likely to marry or stay married to men with
whom they bear children, in part because they can better support
their children in a two-income household than in a single-parent
household receiving minimal government benefits. This idea,
however, assumes that women will enter or stay in marriages
purely due to economic considerations, when non-economic factors
actually play a significant role in women's decisions to divorce or
not to marry in the first place.15 The second assumption is that
when the government denies them benefits, women will turn to
marriage as a financial solution rather than to other alternatives,
154. See, e.g., KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS
SURVIVE WELFARE AND Low-WAGE WORK 42-45 (1997) (analyzing the budgets of welfare-
reliant mothers and finding that work and family resources account for over thirty percent
of their income); Lisa A. Crooms, The Mythical, Magical "Underclass: Constructing Poverty
in Race and Gender, Making the Public Private and the Private Public, 5 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 87, 101 n.61 (2001) (citing a study that found that over forty percent of women on
welfare use welfare benefits in conjunction with employment to support their families).
155. See Friedman, supra note 100, at 658-59.
156. Indeed, Laura M. Friedman asserts that the "Iflamily [clap does nothing to help
welfare mothers become self-supporting" and, moreover, [wlithholding necessary funds
simply plunges the entire family further into poverty and dependency." Id.
157. See generally Friedman, supra note 100, at 656 n.109 (noting that "[diecisions about
childbearing, marriage, and living arrangements are very complex" and that "[tlhey surely
are not unaffected by economic incentives, but they are affected by a host of other factors as
well"). For instance, women may not even have the option to marry; many scholars note that
poor men are often reluctant to enter into a marriage and a family without adequate and
secure employment. See Crooms, supra note 154, at 114-15; Smith, supra note 78, at 187-90.
Many women also choose to leave their marriages when domestic violence occurs. See
Crooms, supra note 154, at 127-28.
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such as finding a job (or even a second job), securing cheaper
day care, or cutting corners on housing, clothing, and food expendi-
tures. 158 For various reasons, however, women may not want to use
marriage as their financial crutch when they can no longer receive
adequate TANF benefits,159 a very real possibility that undermines
the ability of family cap laws to promote marriage and family
values. The third assumption is that family caps will reduce the
incidence of out-of-wedlock births, because presumably, poor women
will not have children if they have less money with which to provide
for them. Yet this assumption ignores the fact that many people
"want to be parents and to share their lives with a child," regardless
of their financial situation, 160 and that there is no indication of any
association between women's procreative decisions and the receipt
of public assistance benefits. 161 Consequently, each of the presump-
tions on which the government bases its "marriage and family
values" rationale for family cap laws is ill-founded, and thus, family
cap laws logically cannot promote these objectives.
Family cap laws simply cannot achieve the goals that policy-
makers envisioned when implementing these laws. They do not
provide incentives for women on welfare to have fewer children,
assume personal responsibility, or escape dependency on public
assistance. In addition, family cap laws do not promote traditional
social values of marriage and family among welfare recipients.
Family cap legislation fails to meet its own ends, because the
presumptions in which its objectives are rooted are plagued with
inconsistencies. Essentially, family caps do not begin to reach their
own goals, because the logical link between the laws and their
purposes is wholly absent.
158. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 154, for an excellent discussion of the economic
sacrifices that indigent mothers make on a regular basis in order to sustain their household.
159. See supra note 157. Women may also divorce or not marry in order to avoid an
unhappy and unloving marriage.
160. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform
Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 739-40 (1992).
161. See supra note 149.
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B. Meeting the Goals of PRWORA
When Congress broadened the states' power under section 1115
of the Social Security Act to establish pilot or experimental projects
for welfare reform, it anticipated that states would quickly begin to
implement programs, like family cap laws, that would further
promote the objectives of PRWORA.6 2 As discussed earlier,
policymakers saw PRWORA as the tool for achieving three primary
goals: emphasizing the role that stable marriages and families can
have in reducing welfare dependency, reducing welfare caseloads,
and decreasing the rate of poverty among Americans.163 In design-
ing family cap laws as "experimental" programs under section 1115
of the Social Security Act, states have attempted to meet these
objectives of PRWORA. Yet a closer examination of the ways in
which family cap laws affect the goals of PRWORA reveals that
these laws fail to achieve, and indeed frustrate, the purposes of the
1996 welfare reform.
Family cap legislation fails to advance one of the central goals of
PRWORA-to reduce dependency on welfare by promoting marriage
and family values among welfare recipients. As explained in the
previous section, family cap laws, in practice, do not encourage
welfare recipients to marry or stay married and to maintain
"stable" family relationships, because the presumptions behind this
objective are seriously flawed. 14 Consequently, family cap laws fail
to justify the use of such a marriage- and family-based initiative as
an instrument in the reduction of welfare dependency. In addition,
even government studies indicate that dependence on welfare has
not contributed in any significant way to the "fall" of the traditional
nuclear family. 6 As a result, the government's use of family cap
legislation to attack the "lack" of family values among TANF
recipients simply cannot solve the problem of welfare dependency
and thus fails to achieve one of PRWORA's ultimate goals.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
163. See discussion supra Part I.C.
164. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
165. See Martha F. Davis, The New Paternalism: War on Poverty or War on Women?, 1
GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 88, 90 (1993) (citing government studies that defeat the
stereotype that impoverished Americans lack family values).
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Family cap laws also fail to reduce significantly the number of
Americans on public assistance. Of course, family caps do reduce
either the benefits paid out to recipient families or the number of
children who receive benefits, depending on the structure of the
specific state law. 166 They do not encourage self-sufficiency,
however, or an improved work ethic among welfare recipients,
because the underlying presumption that Americans rely on TANF
out of laziness or a lack of motivation is simply wrong.167 For most
recipients, reliance on welfare stems from temporary economic
necessity, and a family cap law that reduces the benefits they
receive only exaggerates their economic plight.'68 As a result, family
cap laws work only to reduce the number of children who receive
benefits or the amount of benefits that a TANF recipient family can
receive, and they do not serve the greater purpose of PRWORA to
decrease welfare caseloads by promoting personal responsibility.
Finally, family cap laws cannot achieve what is arguably the
most important goal of PRWORA-reducing the number of
Americans who live in poverty. Though family cap laws clearly have
undertones that stress the importance of work as a means off public
assistance and out of poverty, they simply do not promote self-
sufficiency among recipients. 169 Instead, they only perpetuate the
cycle of poverty that plagues the indigent class of Americans by
withholding significant, albeit minimal, benefits from families who
find themselves in dire economic situations. 17 By receiving a
166. See discussion supra Part II.A for a brief overview of the differences among various
family cap and child exclusion laws throughout the country.
167. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
168. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy
Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 HOW. L.J. 473, 508
(1995) (denouncing the stereotype of "the welfare queen" who has children merely to receive
public assistance and arguing that family caps serve only to push recipients further into
poverty); supra note 156.
169. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text for discussions of the failure of family
cap laws to promote personal responsibility among recipients.
170. See Friedman, supra note 100, at 661-62 ("[TANF] families can barely clothe and feed
their children on the pre-Family Cap benefits they receive. The denial of additional funds
often means the family will become homeless because there is not enough money to pay
rent..); NOW Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, supra note 79 (labeling child exclusion laws as
programs that "increase, rather than alleviate, hardship for poor families," because they
"den[y] incremental benefit increases that are needed to raise an additional child at a bare
subsistence level").
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stagnant amount of income to support a larger family, poor families
who are subject to the family cap will find themselves struggling
even harder to support themselves. By implementing family cap
legislation, states only frustrate PRWORA's war on poverty,
because they deny welfare recipients the means they need to
support themselves.
Though one of the intentions of the 1996 welfare reform was to
encourage states to use pilot projects like family cap laws to meet
the long-term goals of PRWORA, the reality of these laws simply
makes that purpose unattainable. Family cap laws cannot reduce
dependency on public assistance by promoting marriage and family,
because the assumption that marriage is a solution to welfare
dependency is not logical. Family cap laws, furthermore, can only
minimally reduce the number of TANF recipients, because they do
not address the real source of dependency on welfare-economic
necessity, not a lack of personal responsibility. Most importantly,
family cap laws do not even begin to tackle the poverty problem. By
denying recipients increased benefits for additional children born,
family cap laws only contribute to the causes of poverty among
Americans today.
C. Meeting the Goals of the American Welfare System
The previous two sections discussed whether family cap laws
achieve their own purposes and the purposes of PRWORA, but the
most important analysis remains: whether family cap laws achieve
the objectives of the American welfare system. As the welfare
program has developed throughout the twentieth century, its goals
have likewise evolved. President Roosevelt's vision that ADC could
provide a safety net for the indigent and eventually lift all Ameri-
cans out of poverty171 did not perish with the New Deal but instead
persisted in the coming decades; indeed, remnants of this ideal are
even evident in the welfare reform of the 1990s.172 Yet as welfare
caseloads grew dramatically from the early 1960s through the late
1970s, policymakers found that these goals were simply no longer
171. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
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sufficient to guide the structure of the American welfare system.17
3
Reform became essential to the survival of the public assistance
program in America, and that reform came largely through the
rhetoric of personal responsibility, self-sufficiency, and "workfare."
Thus, a second primary goal of the welfare system emerged:
promoting work and self-sufficiency among welfare recipients in
order to reduce caseloads. Though family cap laws developed as one
tool in the reform of the welfare system, they completely fail to
achieve any of the goals that lie at the heart of the American
welfare system.
Family cap laws do not achieve the traditional goals of the
American welfare system to provide a safety net to poor Americans
and, eventually, to reduce the number of Americans in poverty.
Family cap laws do not support the notion that TANF should serve
as security to protect the indigent from poverty, because they force
welfare women to support their children with fewer benefits at their
disposal.174 Thus, family cap laws eliminate, rather than provide, a
safety net for poor Americans. Without this safety net it only
becomes more likely that people who slip into poverty will not
rebound to economic security. Once impoverished, the indigent only
face greater struggles in states that have implemented family cap
laws, because the denial of additional benefits to care for newborn
children will only perpetuate the cycle of poverty and welfare
dependency. 7 ' In the states that use family caps as a means of
"welfare reform," the goal of the American welfare system to
provide a security net for poor Americans and eventually lift them
out of poverty is impossible to achieve.
Family cap legislation also cannot meet the more modern goal of
the American welfare system to promote self-sufficiency and
employment among public assistance recipients. As discussed
earlier, this objective assumes that welfare women depend on
TANF and avoid work and personal responsibility because they can,
and that with less "incentive" to rely on welfare, women will finally
173. See discussion supra Part I.B-C.
174. See, e.g., Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 36, at 743-44, 747 ("Some features of the
approved state projects [that restrict the distribution of benefits] depart drastically from the
core values of the AFDC program.").
175. See supra notes 168, 170 and accompanying text.
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become self-sufficient.'76 Yet logically, family cap laws do not serve
this purpose, because dependence on welfare is generally a
temporary phenomenon that occurs when lifestyle changes drain
financial resources, not a permanent situation that is the product
of irresponsibility. 7 ' Because family cap laws improperly assume
the causes of welfare dependency, they cannot function to increase
personal responsibility and build stronger work ethics among
recipients. As a result, family cap laws do not serve one of the
central purposes of the American welfare system.
The American welfare system has permitted states to implement
experimental programs that frustrate, rather than advance, its
long-term goals. The New Dealers saw public assistance as a means
to an end of eradicating poverty. Subsequent administrations
continued to embrace this goal, albeit to a lesser degree, while they
formulated another approach to attack poverty and welfare
dependency that centered on promoting work and personal
responsibility. The recent onslaught of family cap legislation erases
much of the hope that those goals are attainable. Instead of
providing Americans with the security they need to lift themselves
out of poverty, and instead of providing tools to the indigent to find
work and become self-sufficient, family cap laws propagate
American dependency on welfare. In essence, they fail to deliver on
the most important purpose of the American welfare system-to
keep Americans out of poverty.
D. Counterarguments and Statistical Data
The above analysis finds that family cap laws are ineffective in
meeting the goals they were intended to achieve. Proponents of
family cap legislation, however, might point to statistical data to
demonstrate that family cap laws do have a logical basis and do
indeed achieve the goals they were designed to meet. Though these
statistics might be persuasive facially, deeper analysis of this data
reveals that available studies do not, in fact, undermine the
argument presented above.
176. See supra text accompanying note 152.
177. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
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Advocates for family cap legislation assert that the laws work to
reduce the number of Americans on public assistance. To the
contrary, studies indicate that the nation's continuing preoccupa-
tion with increasing caseloads and expenditures for welfare
recipients 7 ' is, in fact, largely unfounded. One study shows that
although the number of families on AFDC rose by thirty-seven
percent between 1975 and 1995, the cumulative amount of benefit
payments made to families during that same period decreased by
fifteen percent (with adjustments for inflation).179 This data reflects
that by 1995, the United States was "spending less money (in terms
of real purchasing power) and spreading it more thinly to cover
considerably more poor people. The consequence, of course, is that
average AFDC benefits have fallen dramatically." 8 0 Without a true
welfare "problem" to solve, the government's goal of reducing
welfare caseloads simply remains unattainable.
Proponents of family cap laws might also argue that women on
welfare have fewer children when they are subject to a family cap
restriction. Yet studies do not uniformly support this proposition;
at best, family cap laws may only slightly reduce the fertility rate
among welfare recipients.' 8 ' Statistics reveal, furthermore, that
higher welfare benefits do not lead to larger welfare families,
8 2
suggesting that the size of TANF families is largely not a function
of the amount of benefits they receive. Additionally, there is a
negative correlation between the length of time a woman receives
welfare and the number of children she has, such that "[tihe longer
a woman remains on welfare, the less likely she is to give 
birth."'i 3
This data suggests that a decrease in benefits due to application of
a family cap law will not have a significant impact on the childbear-
178. See discussion supra Part I.B; supra text accompanying note 29.
179. GILENS, supra note 13, at 19.
180. Id.
181. See sources cited supra note 151. Additionally, the fertility rate among welfare
recipients is not higher than the rate among non-welfare recipients, and in many cases, it is
actually lower. See Note, Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of Reform, 107 HARV.
L. REv. 2013, 2020 (1994) thereinafter Dethroning the Welfare Queen].
182. See Dethroning the Welfare Queen, supra note 181, at 2020; sources cited supra note
149.
183. Roger J.R. Levesque, Looking to Unwed Dads to Fill the Public Purse: A Disturbing
Wave in Welfare Reform, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 24 n.100 (1994).
4092004]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ing decisions of women on welfare, 84 because welfare mothers are
already having fewer children without being subject to family cap
restrictions. As a result, statistics do not support the government's
proposition that family cap laws will reduce the number of children
born to women on welfare.
In addition, proponents of family cap laws might counter this
Note's analysis by emphasizing that family cap laws are encourag-
ing TANF recipients to marry and to maintain cohesive nuclear
families. Yet one available study actually indicates that the
American welfare system has no significant impact on the structure
of families who receive welfare."s There is, however, very little
statistical data on this issue, which raises the question of why the
federal government and the states have failed to release any data
that support their asserted rationale for implementing family cap
laws. On the whole, there are statistics that validate proponents'
claims that family cap laws promote marriage and family values
among welfare recipients.
Finally, proponents might claim that family cap laws are forcing
welfare recipients to work in order to support their families, which
in turn allows them to escape poverty and simultaneously reduces
TANF caseloads. To the contrary, the federal government's own
statistics do not document that this phenomenon is occurring."l 8
Studies also suggest that many welfare recipients do work in order
to support their families.187 As a result, the government's assertion
that family cap laws are increasing welfare recipients' participation
in the workforce remains unsupported.
On the whole, it is clear that studies do not support any likely
counterargument that proponents might wage against this Note's
184. See id. at 23-24 (arguing that "[tihe underlying assumptions of the link between
behavior [of poor Americans] and financial incentives are unsound").
185. See David T. Ellwood & Mary Jo Bane, The Impact ofAFDC on Family Structure and
Living Arrangements, 7 RES. LAB. ECON. 137, 143 (1985), quoted in Allison B. Smith, Note,
The Breakdown of the American Family: Why Welfare Reform is Not the Answer, 11 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETIcs & PUB. POLY 761, 785 (1997).
186. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Admin. for Children and Families, Office
of Family Assistance, supra note 75, at http//www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/ annualreport5
(showing no data on the effect of family cap laws on work participation rates among welfare
recipients).
187. See, e.g., EDIN & LEIN, supra note 154, at 44 (finding that forty-six percent of welfare-
reliant mothers work as a "survival strateg"); Crooms, supra note 154, at 101.
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analysis of family cap laws. In reality, the welfare caseloads have
not increased dramatically over the years, thus making it difficult
for family cap laws to significantly reduce the number of Americans
on public assistance. Recent research also does not fully support the
proposition that women on welfare have fewer children when
subject to a family cap restriction. Additionally, studies are scarce
as to whether family cap laws do, in fact, promote marriage and
family values among recipients and as to whether the laws
encourage recipients to work. Consequently, the available statisti-
cal data does not support the government's assertion that family
cap laws can achieve their intended goals, and it does not challenge
the conclusion that family cap laws are an ineffective means of
welfare reform.
CONCLUSION
Traced back to the era of the New Deal, the roots of the current
public assistance program in America reflect the idea that public
assistance should be an economic safety net that saves people from
indigency and ultimately empowers them to find their way out of
poverty. Though the system has evolved throughout the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries, several of its purposes have remained
over the years-namely, to move people off public assistance and to
eradicate poverty. Other goals that digress from these ideals
developed in the last few decades, especially with the passage of
PRWORA. In particular, the goals of promoting work, personal
responsibility, and stronger marriage and family values among
welfare recipients recently emerged at the forefront of the political
debate over welfare reform. In adopting this more conservative
approach to welfare reform, states have turned to various legisla-
tive instruments, such as family cap laws, to achieve these goals. In
theory, family cap laws promote self-sufficiency, provide a disincen-
tive for dependency on welfare, and strengthen family values; in
practice, this link is nonexistent.
Opponents of family cap legislation have failed to persuade the
courts that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine renders family
cap laws violative of due process and equal protection, under either
the federal or various state constitutions. The Supreme Court
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refused to find Maryland's family cap law unconstitutional in
Dandridge, and the state courts that have subsequently addressed
the issue appear reluctant to declare unconstitutional laws that
both the Congress and the states have deemed necessary and useful
means of reforming the welfare system. The decisions in C.K,
Sojourner A., and N.B. illustrate this reluctance.
Without any indication that the courts will be willing to recon-
sider their consistent affirmance of the states' implementation
of family cap laws, only one viable avenue of attack remains for
opponents to challenge this legislation: the legislature itself. As
illustrated in Part IV, an assessment of the goals of family cap
legislation, PRWORA, and the American welfare system reveals
that family cap laws fail to adequately meet any of the objectives
that allegedly justify their implementation. They do not promote
self-sufficiency, personal responsibility, or a stronger work ethic.
They do not strengthen marriages or family values. At best, they
only minimally reduce the number of people receiving welfare.
Most importantly, they do not live up to the ideal upon which the
American welfare system was founded and upon which it is
ultimately still based-reducing, if not eliminating, poverty among
indigent Americans. Though many of the recent structural changes
to TANF are admirable attempts to transform a clearly failing
system, family cap legislation is simply not an effective method of
achieving that change. The only realistic effect that family cap laws
have on welfare recipients is increased hardship and suffering. If
the courts are unwilling to recognize the arguably "unconstitutional
conditions" that family cap laws place on welfare recipients,
perhaps the state legislatures will be willing to reconsider the
implementation of legislation that fails to achieve the very purposes
on which it is premised.
The legislative approach that this Note advocates is a realistic
way for opponents of family cap legislation finally to succeed in
overturning this ineffective method of welfare reform. This proposal
does not ignore the reality that the intense partisanship that
dominates Congress today makes it unlikely that the national
government will pass a law that prohibits states from implementing
family cap laws under the waiver provision of section 1115 of the
Social Security Act. Legislative challenges to family cap laws,
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however, can and should reach far beyond the national government,
for it is the states that are ultimately in control of the implementa-
tion of these laws. By focusing their efforts at the state legislative
level, opponents of family cap laws can dramatically increase the
likelihood of a legislature repealing a family cap law, because it is
much more likely that an individual state, as opposed to a federal
legislature, will consist of a cohesive block of politicians and voters
that will agree with this Note's assessment of the ineffectiveness of
family cap laws. Harkening back to the roots of family cap
legislation-section 1115 of the Social Security Act-state legisla-
tures need to start reconsidering whether family cap laws still
qualify as an "experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which,
in the judgment of the Secretary [of the Department of Health and
Human Services], is likely to assist in promoting the objectives" of
the Social Security Act. 188 Section 1115 permits the Secretary of
HHS to grant waivers only for those projects that are "likely to
assist in promoting the objectives" of the American welfare
system.'89 This Note demonstrates that family cap laws no longer
qualify as such an experimental project, because they clearly do not
achieve any of the goals they were intended to serve, particularly
any of the goals of the American welfare system.
In eliminating family cap legislation, states can replace those
laws with reform measures that actually promote personal
responsibility, strengthen families, reduce the welfare rolls, and
reduce poverty. Heightened access to employment, childcare, and
transportation is one example of a reform that would serve these
goals. With affordable childcare and transportation, employment
might actually become a realistic alternative to welfare for many
Americans. "9 Another reform that would serve these goals is a raise
188. Social Security Act of 1988 § 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2000).
189. Id.
190. See Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare As We Know It"." The Win/Win Spin or the
Stench of Victory, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 131, 169-73 (2001) (summarizing recent
proposals by the Clinton and Bush administrations and congressional representatives to
reform wage laws and welfare programs to increase access to employment, job training,
childcare, and transportation, and recommending similar reforms in order to increase self-
sufficiency and decrease poverty among welfare recipients); see also Welfare Reform: Building
on Success, Hearing on Welfare Reform Before the Sen. Fin. Comm., 108th Cong. (2003)
(statement of Margy Waller, Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution Center), 2003 'WL
11716251 (arguing that proposed TANF reauthorization legislation would hinder the
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in the minimum wage or, alternatively, the adoption of living wage
legislation. By ensuring that employment pays not only more than
welfare but also enough to sustain a single-parent-headed house-
hold, reformation of wage laws would increase recipients' ability
and motivation to support their families through work, which would
in turn reduce welfare caseloads, strengthen and improve family
relationships, and, eventually, work to eliminate poverty in the
United States.19' These measures are only two examples of reforms
that states could use to actually achieve the goals that family cap
laws were supposed to meet-and there are countless others.
Unless state legislators begin to truly reassess current welfare
reform laws like family cap legislation, however, the goals of
PRWORA, and especially the American welfare system, will remain
unattainable. It is time for the states to experiment with a new
method of welfare reform, because family cap laws simply are not
getting it done.
Kelly J. Gastley*
flexibility that states currently have in providing significant services like education, job
training, childcare, and transportation that support indigent Americans and help them out
of poverty).
191. See Peter Edelman, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:
Implications for Welfare Reform in the United States, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 285,287
(1998) (citing the living wage as an issue that PRWORA has made even more important due
to the reform's significant cutbacks in spending for public assistance programs); Pearson
Liddell, Jr. et al., Welfare Reform in Mississippi: TANF Policy and Its Implications, 11 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 1107, 1129 (2003) (asserting that "provid[ing] a standard of
living that at least meets the poverty income level for working TANF recipients" must be an
essential part of better welfare reform efforts).
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